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I. INTRODUCTION 
Should the law punish the dead? If so, should the courts or the 
legislature decide the issue? These questions arise in the context of 
punitive damages. Punitive, or exemplary, damages are generally 
awarded to punish and deter certain wrongful conduct. In some 
situations, however, an exemplary award may not advance these 
longstanding purposes of punitive damages. Specifically, a tortfeasor 
who dies before damages are levied can no longer be punished or 
deterred. Thus, a punitive award, in such situations, would frustrate the 
purposes of punitive damages. For these reasons, a majority of 
jurisdictions agree that punitive damages cannot be awarded against a 
deceased tortfeasor’s estate. However, courts in a growing minority of 
states, including Ohio, have held to the contrary. 
On July 7, 2014, in Whetstone v. Binner, the Ohio Fifth District 
Court of Appeals, consisting of a divided three-judge panel, held that a 
plaintiff injured in a tort action could recover punitive damages against a 
deceased tortfeasor’s estate.1 In its decision, the court acknowledged a 
jurisdictional split on the issue.2 Nevertheless, the court adopted the 
position and reasoning followed by a minority of jurisdictions.3 
The facts that gave rise to the issue at bar are as follows: the great 
aunt of two small children, aged five and two, was responsible for 
watching over and caring for the children.4 The great aunt assaulted the 
five-year-old girl by “strangling and attempting to suffocate her while 
restraining her against her will.”5 The children’s mother arrived home 
during the chaos to find the great aunt with a pillow over her daughter’s 
face and a hand around her daughter’s neck.6 The mother freed her 
daughter from the great aunt’s grasp and fled the house with the great 
1. 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.) (one justice dissenting). 
2. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 22. 
3. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 26. 
4. Merit Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 6, Whetstone v. Binner, No. 2014-1462. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 13
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss2/13
2016] ADDING INSULT TO DEATH 555 
aunt “chasing after her and her children.”7 
The plaintiff-mother filed suit against the great aunt alleging 
assault, battery, false and/or unlawful imprisonment, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.8 Importantly, a judgment was entered 
against the defendant-great aunt while she was alive.9 Thereafter, the 
plaintiff filed a suggestion of death indicating that the defendant-great 
aunt died and that the great aunt’s daughter was appointed administrator 
of the estate.10 At the hearing on damages, after the great aunt’s death, 
the trial court awarded $500 in compensatory damages for lost wages to 
the plaintiff-mother, $1,000 in non-economic damages for past and 
future emotional distress to the unharmed two-year-old child, and 
$50,000 in non-economic damages to the five-year-old for physical 
injury and past and future emotional harm and distress.11 However, the 
trial court declined to award punitive damages to the plaintiff, reasoning 
that “punitive damages cannot be awarded against the estate of a 
tortfeasor who is deceased.”12 
The Fifth District Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court 
and, thus, aligned Ohio with a small minority of jurisdictions that allows 
punitive damages to be imposed against a deceased tortfeasor’s estate.13 
The Supreme Court of Ohio granted certiorari and, thereafter, heard oral 
arguments on the case.14 On March 15, 2016, the Court, in a 4-3 
decision, upheld the appellate decision, concluding that “a punitive-
damages award is available in the limited circumstances presented 
here.”15 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice O’Connor acknowledged a 
jurisdictional split on the threshold issue of whether punitive damages 
may be imposed against an estate.16 However, the court did not 
expressly align Ohio with either the majority or minority, and, instead, 
decided the case on the facts presented. The Court’s analysis focused on 
the fact that the defendant was alive when the trial court entered 
judgment against her for assault, false imprisonment, emotional distress, 
7. Id. 
8. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 3. 
9. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 4. 
10. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 6. 
11. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 10. 
12. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 6 (citing Mongold v. Estate of Gilbert, 114 Ohio Misc.
2d 32, 35-36, 758 N.E.2d 1245, 1247-49 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2000)). 
13. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 26. See also Appendices C and D infra for a list of
minority jurisdictions. 
14. Whetstone v. Binner, 141 Ohio St.3d 1473, 25 N.E.3d 1080 (Table), 2015-Ohio-554. 
15. Whetstone v. Binner, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-1006, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 
16. Whetstone, 2016-Ohio-1006 at ¶ 17-18. 
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and loss of consortium.17 For that reason, the Court ultimately held that 
“in cases in which liability has been determined while the tortfeasor is 
alive, punitive damages are available to the plaintiff.”18 Nevertheless, 
the actual effect of such a holding in this case is that punitive damages 
may be imposed against the defendant’s estate because, at the time of the 
Court’s decision, she was deceased and any punitive award would be 
paid by her estate. 
Two justices authored dissenting opinions.19 Each dissenter 
expressed that the appellate decision should be reversed because the 
imposition of punitive damages against an estate does not further the 
espoused purposes of punitive damages in Ohio.20 The effect of the Ohio 
Supreme Court’s majority opinion has left uncertainty in the law as to 
whether punitive damages may be imposed against a deceased tortfeasor 
in Ohio. Although the Court held that punitive damages could be 
awarded against an estate in the limited circumstances of Whetstone,21 it 
did not express a bright line rule on the threshold issue. The appellate 
decision, in contrast, did acknowledge that its decision placed Ohio in 
the minority.22 For the following reasons, this Comment argues that both 
the appellate and Supreme Court decisions are contrary to the 
longstanding purposes of punitive damages. 
While other jurisdictions have offered different reasons for 
awarding punitive damages, the Supreme Court of Ohio has repeatedly 
expressed that punishment and deterrence are the only two purposes that 
should be considered when imposing punitive awards.23 The appellate 
holding in Whetstone v. Binner is contrary to the Supreme Court’s prior 
interpretation of punitive damages in that the Whetstone holding does 
not truly advance these espoused purposes. General deterrence alone is 
not a sufficient reason to support the recovery of punitive damages 
following the death of the tortfeasor. Not only is the appellate court’s 
reasoning contrary to Ohio common law, its holding is not supported by 
statute, and negative policy concerns arise from the holding.24 The 
Supreme Court of Ohio’s prior decisions align with the majority view 
that punitive damages cannot be awarded in such situations. 
Furthermore, the legislature may be better suited to address the issue at 
17. Whetstone, 2016-Ohio-1006 at ¶ 21-24. 
18. Whetstone, 2016-Ohio-1006 at ¶ 24. 
19. See generally Whetstone, 2016-Ohio-1006 at ¶ 28-45. 
20. See Whetstone, 2016-Ohio-1006 at ¶28-45. 
21. Whetstone, 2016-Ohio-1006 at ¶ 1. 
22. Whetstone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.). 
23. See infra Part III.A.
24. See infra Parts III.A, III.B, and IV.
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bar and, if so, should adopt a statute contrary to the Whetstone holding. 
Thus, whether it does so judicially or statutorily, Ohio should adopt the 
majority view that a claim for punitive damages cannot survive the death 
of the tortfeasor. 
Part II of this Comment provides the background information 
necessary for a meaningful discussion of the issue, including an 
overview of compensatory and punitive damages, as well as state 
survival statutes, and the relevant law specific to Ohio in comparison to 
other jurisdictions. Part III analyzes whether Ohio should impose 
punitive damages against the estates of tortfeasors. Part IV discusses the 
broader policy implications of the majority and minority views and 
whether the courts or the legislature is better suited to address the issue. 
Finally, Part V embraces the ultimate conclusion that Ohio should adopt 
the majority position and disallow punitive damages after the death of a 
tortfeasor. It also suggests that either the Ohio General Assembly or the 
Supreme Court of Ohio should overrule the appellate holding in 
Whetstone. 
II. BACKGROUND
Part A of this section discusses the types of damages awarded in 
tort actions; compensatory damages are discussed in Part A.1 and 
punitive damages are discussed in Part A.2. Part B discusses how 
punitive damages are awarded in Ohio and the applicable Ohio statutes 
while Part C introduces survival statutes, both in Ohio and other states. 
Part D outlines the seminal court cases in Ohio that discuss whether a 
deceased tortfeasor’s estate is liable for punitive damages. Finally, Part 
E outlines the discussion of the issue in other jurisdictions and the 
majority and minority views across those jurisdictions. 
A. General Damages in Tort Actions 
Generally, a plaintiff files suit against an alleged wrongdoer in 
order to receive some type of remedy. Remedies can include injunctions 
and declaratory judgments issued by a court, but most tort plaintiffs seek 
damages against the defendant. “Damages have been defined to be the 
compensation which the law will award for an injury done . . . .”25 In 
other words, the term “damages” describes an award for a legally 
recognized harm.26 Intentional torts, such as assault or battery, are 
25. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 86 (1897). 
26. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1047 (2000). 
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inherently harmful to the plaintiff, and, thus, the plaintiff is always 
entitled to some form of relief.27 Furthermore, damages are one of the 
four elements of a negligence claim.28 The remainder of this section will 
discuss two types of damages awarded in tort actions: compensatory 
damages and punitive damages. 
1. Compensatory Damages
The most common type of damages recoverable by a plaintiff in a 
tort action is compensatory damages.29 Compensatory damages are 
designed to repay the plaintiff for losses that resulted from the tort.30 The 
goal of compensatory damages is that the plaintiff should be restored to 
her original position before the injury as if the harm had never taken 
place.31 Thus, such damages may not exceed the amount that makes the 
plaintiff whole.32 Compensatory damages may include awards for lost 
earnings, medical expenses, emotional distress, and mental and physical 
pain and suffering, among many other things.33 There are also several 
other types of damages available to tort victims, including nominal, 
liquidated, and punitive damages. 
2. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages go beyond the purposes of compensatory 
damages. The term “punitive” is defined as “[i]nvolving or inflicting 
punishment.”34 The United States Supreme Court has stated that the 
primary purposes of such damages are to “punish[] . . . the guilty, to 
deter from any such proceeding for the future, and [to prove] the 
detestation of the jury to the action itself.”35 Thus, in certain situations, a 
plaintiff may be entitled to additional damages where certain types of 
conduct are involved.36 Punitive damages are “allowable in excess of the 
actual loss where a tort is aggravated by evil motive, actual malice, 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 28 Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015). 
32. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 31 Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015). 
33. See DOBBS, supra note 26, at 1047-62. Compensatory damages may also be awarded for
invasions of constitutional rights and harms to property. See id. at 1053-56. 
34. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1354 (9th ed. 2009). 
35. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 87 (1897) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. DOBBS, supra note 26, at 1062. 
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deliberate violence, or oppression.”37 
Courts generally cite two primary reasons for the awarding of 
punitive damages: to punish and to deter.38 As expressed in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, punitive damages are meant to punish 
the tortfeasor for the wrongful act and to discourage the tortfeasor, 
specifically, and the public, generally, from committing similar 
conduct.39 However, some jurisdictions award punitive damages for 
other reasons, including where compensatory damages were insufficient 
to make the plaintiff whole.40 Still, other courts use punitive awards to 
compensate “a plaintiff for the humiliation, sense of outrage, and 
indignity resulting from injuries maliciously, wilfully and wantonly 
inflicted by the defendant.”41 While most courts focus on the punishment 
and deterrence of the tortfeasor in awarding punitive damages, a 
minority of jurisdictions emphasizes “the harm done the plaintiff” as 
well as other purposes.42 
Courts treat compensatory and punitive awards quite differently.43 
Fundamentally, compensatory damages cannot enhance the plaintiff’s 
situation, while punitive damages effectively compensate far beyond 
making the injured party whole. Compensatory damages may be reduced 
by a plaintiff’s comparative negligence or some other mitigating factor, 
yet punitive damages are generally not decreased under similar 
circumstances.44 Also, courts and legislatures often impose a higher 
burden of proof for the recovery of punitive damages.45 
Nearly all jurisdictions permit judges and juries to assess punitive 
damages against the tortfeasor.46 Punitive damages are only available to 
the plaintiff where the tortfeasor acted with bad intent or malice.47 There 
must be “some element of outrage” due to the tortfeasor’s malicious 
37. Scott, 165 U.S. at 86. 
38. DOBBS, supra note 26, at 1063; See also Freudeman v. Landing of Canton, 702 F.3d 318,
330 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying Ohio law). Punishment and deterrence are often referred to as the 
“twin aims” of punitive damages. 
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979). 
40. Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2000 MT 55, ¶ 45, 298 Mont. 438, 995 P.2d 1002. 
41. Kewin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 55 (Mich. 1980) (internal quotation
marks omitted). 
42. Id. 
43. Timothy R. Robicheaux & Brian H. Bornstein, Punished, Dead or Alive: Empirical
Perspectives on Awarding Punitive Damages Against Deceased Defendants, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 393, 395 (2010). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 86 (1897). 
47. Id. 
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intent or reckless indifference to others.48 For example, an Ohio jury 
awarded a decedent’s estate $15 million in punitive damages where the 
defendant’s train struck and killed the decedent, and the defendant could 
have easily prevented the accident.49 
B. Punitive Damages in Ohio 
Ohio has codified the procedure for recovering punitive damages.50 
Revised Code 2315.21 allows for a plaintiff’s recovery of punitive 
damages only where the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor “demonstrate 
malice or aggravated or egregious fraud, or that defendant as principal or 
master knowingly authorized, participated in, or ratified actions or 
omissions of an agent or servant that so demonstrate.”51 In addition, the 
trier of fact must first determine whether the plaintiff may recover 
compensatory damages before awarding punitive damages.52 “The 
compensatory-damages requirement prevents plaintiffs from bringing 
cases solely for an award of punitive damages . . . .”53 Punitive damages 
“are not independent remedies.”54 Furthermore, a plaintiff may not 
recover punitive damages of more than twice the amount of the 
plaintiff’s compensatory award.55 
Pursuant to R.C. 2315.21 (the punitive damages statute), the fact-
finder must determine that the tortfeasor committed the act with “actual 
malice” before the plaintiff is eligible to receive punitive damages.56 
“Actual malice” for the purposes of awarding punitive damages is “(1) 
that state of mind under which a person’s conduct is characterized by 
hatred, ill will or a spirit of revenge, or (2) a conscious disregard for the 
rights and safety of other persons that has a great probability of causing 
substantial harm.”57 
Revised Code 2315.21 provides the framework for the awarding of 
punitive damages. However, punitive awards developed from the 
common law, and Ohio courts have molded the doctrine through judicial 
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. b (1979). 
49. Wightman v. Consol. Rail Corp., 715 N.E.2d 546, 550 (Ohio 1999). 
50. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (West, Westlaw through Files 1-29 of 131st Gen. Ass.
2015-2016). 
51.  § 2315.21(C)(1) (Westlaw). 
52.  § 2315.21(C)(2) (Westlaw). 
53. Niskanen v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 122 Ohio St. 3d 486, 2009-Ohio-3626, 912 N.E.2d 595, ¶
13. 
54. Niskanen at ¶ 13. 
55.  § 2315.21(D)(2)(a) (Westlaw). 
56. Preston v. Murty, 512 N.E.2d 1174, 1176 (Ohio 1987). 
57. Id. 
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decisions.58 Specifically, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “[t]he 
purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate a plaintiff, but to 
punish and deter certain conduct.”59 The punishment of the tortfeasor 
should not go beyond the twin aims of punitive damages, and the 
primary focus of punitive awards should be the defendant-tortfeasor 
rather than the plaintiff.60 
C. State Survival Statutes 
State survival statutes play an important role in bringing an action 
and recovering damages following the death of a litigant. Survival 
statutes provide deceased litigants with the same rights had the death not 
occurred.61 Thus, a living or deceased plaintiff may institute a cause of 
action and seek damages against a deceased defendant’s estate under 
such statutes.62 At common law, actions that could survive the death of 
the tortfeasor generally only included injuries to property.63 However, 
many states, including Ohio, have modified the common-law survival 
standards through statute by expanding or restricting the causes of action 
that survive.64 
Revised Code 2305.21 provides: “In addition to the causes of action 
which survive at common law, causes of action for mesne profits, or 
injuries to the person or property, or for deceit or fraud, also shall 
survive; and such actions may be brought notwithstanding the death of 
the person entitled or liable thereto.”65 In construing R.C. 2305.21, Ohio 
courts have permitted claims for intentional or reckless infliction of 
emotional distress, pain and suffering, legal malpractice, and a claim 
under the Consumer Sales Practices Act following the death of the party 
entitled to or liable for damages.66 Claims for worker’s compensation, 
58. Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 98 Ohio St. 3d 77, 2002-Ohio-7113, 781 
N.E.2d 121, ¶ 188 (citing Roberts v. Mason, 10 Ohio St. 277 (Ohio 1859)). 
59. Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331, 343 (Ohio 1994). See also Dardinger 
at ¶ 178; Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts, 96 Ohio St. 3d 240, 2002-Ohio-3994, 773 N.E.2d 526, ¶ 21. 
60. Dardinger at ¶ 178. 
61. Robicheaux & Bornstein, supra note 33, at 397. 
62. Id. 
63. 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 51 Westlaw (database updated Nov.
2015). 
64. 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 52 Westlaw (database updated Nov.
2015). 
65. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.21 (West, Westlaw through Files 1-29 of 131st Gen. Ass.
2015-2016). 
66. See Williams v. Barrick, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-133, 2008-Ohio-4592, ¶ 10
(emotional distress); Dickerson v. Thompson, 624 N.E.2d 784, 787 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (pain and 
suffering); Loveman v. Hamilton, 420 N.E.2d 1007, 1008 (Ohio 1981) (legal malpractice); Estate of 
9
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slander, libel, violation of civil rights, and malicious prosecution do not 
survive the death of a liable or entitled party under R.C. 2305.21.67 
However, the Supreme Court of Ohio, in Rubeck v. Huffman, permitted a 
deceased party’s next of kin to recover punitive damages against a living 
defendant pursuant to the Survival Statute.68 Based upon the high court’s 
ruling in Rubeck and the Survival Statute, the Fifth District Court of 
Appeals held that a claim for punitive damages could survive the death 
of the tortfeasor and could be awarded against the decedent’s estate 
under R.C. 2305.21.69 
One state, Georgia, expressly prohibits the recovery of punitive 
damages following the death of the tortfeasor in its survival statute.70 
The Georgia code provides that actions for a tort, homicide, or injury do 
not abate with the death of either the plaintiff or the defendant.71 
However, the statute contains a clause that specifically bars the recovery 
of punitive damages against the personal representative of a 
wrongdoer.72 In contrast, two states expressly allow the recovery of 
punitive damages in their survival statutes.73 The relevant Texas statute 
provides: “When the death is caused by the wilful act or omission or 
gross negligence of the defendant, exemplary as well as actual damages 
may be recovered.”74 Oklahoma’s wrongful death statute states that “[i]n 
proper cases . . . punitive or exemplary damages may also be recovered 
against the person proximately causing the wrongful death or the 
person’s representative if such person is deceased.”75 
Cattano v. High Touch Homes, Inc., 6th Dist. Erie No. E-01-022, 2002-Ohio-2631, ¶ 44 (Consumer 
Sales Practices Act). 
67. See Hook v. Springfield, 750 N.E.2d 1162, 1167 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (worker’s 
compensation); Oakwood v. Makar, 463 N.E.2d 61, 64 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (slander); Stein-Sapir 
v. Birdsell, 673 F.2d 165, 167 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (applying Ohio law) (libel); Alsup v.
Int’l Union of Bricklayers, 679 F. Supp. 716, 721 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (applying Ohio law) (violation 
of civil rights); State ex rel. Crow v. Weygandt, 162 N.E.2d 845, 848 (Ohio 1959) (malicious 
prosecution). 
68. 374 N.E.2d 411, 413-14 (Ohio 1978) (per curiam). 
69. Whetstone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.). 
70. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-2-41 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.).
71.  § 9-2-41 (Westlaw). 
72.  § 9-2-41 (Westlaw). 
73. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 399 (End) of the First
Sess. of the 55th Legislature (2015)); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.008, 71.009 
(West, Westlaw through end of 2015 Reg. Sess. of the 84th Legislature). 
74. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.009 (Westlaw).
75. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053(C) (Westlaw).
10
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D. Claims for Punitive Damages Following the Death of the Tortfeasor 
in Ohio Courts 
The appellate decision in Whetstone stated that the issue was one of 
first impression among Ohio appellate courts. However, at least one 
court has opined on whether punitive damages may be imposed against 
an estate.76 Furthermore, the Whetstone court addressed two Ohio 
common pleas court decisions that came to conflicting conclusions on 
the issue.77 In Mongold v. Estate of Gilbert, the common pleas court held 
that punitive damages could not be awarded against a tortfeasor’s 
innocent heirs following the death of the tortfeasor.78 The court was 
concerned that a decision to the contrary would impede the goals of a 
punitive award.79 Specifically, the court reasoned that “the purpose of 
punishment cannot be separated from the purpose of deterrence.”80 
Furthermore, “[t]hrough death, the tortfeasor is no longer subject to legal 
punishment,” and “the purpose of using the tortfeasor as an example to 
others to deter their behavior is greatly diminished, if not completely 
frustrated.”81 
In contrast, another Ohio common pleas court came to the opposite 
conclusion in Individual Business Services, Inc. v. Carmack.82 In a short 
opinion, the trial court held that it was not persuaded by the Mongold 
court’s view “that a decedent’s estate is immune from an award of 
punitive damages since the decedent is no longer available to be 
punished.”83 The court cited Rubeck v. Huffman and R.C. 2305.21, as 
well as the theory of general deterrence, in support of its decision.84 In 
addition, the court reasoned that because punitive damages are inherent 
in a cause of action for fraud, and because R.C. 2305.21 allows causes of 
action for fraud to survive, R.C. 2305.21 allows punitive damages to be 
awarded against a deceased tortfeasor’s estate.85 The courts’ decisions in 
76. Friedman v. Lobos, 23 Ohio Law Abs. 217, 221 1936 WL 2151, *6 (7th Dist.) (holding
that “[s]ince the purpose of awarding exemplary damages is to punish the wrongdoer, as a rule his 
death destroys the right to them and they can not be recovered against his estate or his heirs or other 
representatives). The Friedman case was factually different from Whetstone, however, in that the 
defendant in Friedman died before a judgment was entered against him rather than after. Id. at 218. 
77. Whetsone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905, ¶¶ 17-21 (5th Dist.).
78. 114 Ohio Misc. 2d 32, 36, 758 N.E.2d 1245, 1249 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2000).
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Montgomery C.P. No. 2004 CV 08159, 2009 WL 8235992, at *3 (Dec. 17, 2009). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at *3-4. 
85. Id. at *3. The Whetstone court later followed the same reasoning in its decision.
Whetstone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.). 
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Mongold and Individual Business Services essentially outlined the 
majority and minority views on the issue. 
E. Claims for Punitive Damages Following the Death of the Tortfeasor 
in Other Jurisdictions 
A majority of jurisdictions has held that a claim for punitive 
damages cannot survive the death of the tortfeasor.86 Fourteen states 
have enacted statutes that disallow punitive damages to be awarded 
against a decedent’s estate.87 In addition, thirteen other states, and the 
District of Columbia, have judicially adopted the majority view.88 A 
minority of jurisdictions, on the other hand, has held to the contrary—
that punitive damages can survive the death of a tortfeasor.89 Two states, 
by legislative action, have allowed punitive damages to be awarded 
against a decedent’s estate,90 while nine states have adopted the minority 
view through appellate court decisions.91 
1. Majority Jurisdictions
Most jurisdictions agree that a claim for punitive damages does not 
survive the death of the tortfeasor.92 Courts deciding the issue in 
jurisdictions that award punitive damages pursuant to the traditional twin 
aims reason that punishment and deterrence are not satisfied where the 
tortfeasor is deceased.93 In addition, these courts argue that punishing 
the estate inflicts harm on the innocent heirs rather than the true 
wrongdoer.94 Furthermore, the plaintiffs, in such cases, have already 
86. For purposes of this Comment, a “majority jurisdiction” includes any state that has
disallowed the recovery of punitive damages after the death of the tortfeasor, whether by appellate 
court decision or statute. For a discussion of both the majority and minority views on this subject 
and empirical data, see G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1129-30 & nn.4 & 6 (Pa. 1998); Emily 
Himes Iversen, Note, Invading The Realm Of The Dead: Exploring The (Im)propriety Of Punitive 
Damage Awards Against Estates, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 827, 831-35 (2014); Robicheaux & 
Bornstein, supra note 33, at 410. 
87. See infra Appendix B. 
88. See infra Appendix A.
89. For purposes of this Comment, a “minority jurisdiction” includes any state that has
allowed the recovery of punitive damages after the death of the tortfeasor by either appellate court 
decision or statute. 
90. See infra Appendix D. 
91. See infra Appendix C. 
92. Whetstone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905, ¶ 23 (5th Dist.). 
93. See Parker v. Artery, 889 P.2d 520, 525 (Wyo. 1995); Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins.
Co., 871 P.2d 1343, 1351-52 (N.M. 1994); Lohr v. Byrd, 522 So. 2d 845, 846-47 (Fla. 1988); 
Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400, 408 (Minn. 1982). 
94. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 24. 
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been compensated for their injuries by money damages.95 Stated simply, 
“the reason for awarding punitive damages ceases to exist with the death 
of the tortfeasor.”96 
When rejecting the imposition of punitive damages against an 
estate, most courts hold that a ruling to the contrary thwarts the two main 
reasons for punitive awards.97 Specifically, the retributive element of 
punitive damages is extinguished by the death of the wrongdoer.98 
“Upon the death of the tortfeasor, the law can no longer punish 
him . . . .”99 Because punishment is a desired effect of punitive damages, 
the victim should no longer be entitled to a punitive award when 
punishment of the wrongdoer cannot be achieved.100 
The inability of courts to punish the deceased leaves only the theory 
of deterrence to justify punitive awards against estates. However, 
majority jurisdictions also agree that specific deterrence can no longer be 
furthered after the tortfeasor’s death for the same reasons that a punitive 
award can no longer punish a deceased tortfeasor.101 The Florida 
Supreme Court reasoned that “[i]f deterrence is justified in this instance, 
it would also be justified to require a decedent’s family to pay a fine or 
be imprisoned for the decedent’s criminal conduct.”102 Courts adopting 
the majority reasoning also opine that imposing punitive damages 
against an estate punishes the tortfeasor’s innocent heirs for the 
wrongdoing of the tortfeasor.103 Moreover, “[w]ith the wrongdoer dead, 
there is no one to punish, and to punish the innocent ignores [the] basic 
philosophy of justice.”104 
In Lohr v. Byrd, the Florida Supreme Court considered whether 
punitive damages could be awarded against a deceased tortfeasor’s 
estate.105 In Lohr, the plaintiff, Byrd, sued Lohr’s estate for 
compensatory and punitive damages for injuries caused by an 
automobile accident between the plaintiff and the tortfeasor, Lohr.106 
95. Lohr, 522 So. 2d at 846-47. 
96. Parker, 889 P.2d at 525. 
97. Id. 
98. Id.; Jaramillo, 871 P.2d at 1351-52; Lohr, 522 So. 2d at 846-47; Thompson, 319 N.W.2d
at 408. 
99. Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 33 (Wise, J., dissenting).
100.  Jaramillo, 871 P.2d at 1351. 
101.  See Lohr, 522 So. 2d at 847. 
102.  Id. 
103.  Fehrenbacher v. Quackenbush, 759 F. Supp. 1516, 1521-22 (D. Kan. 1991) (applying 
Kansas law); Lohr, 522 So. 2d at 847. 
104.  Lohr, 522 So. 2d at 847. 
105.  Id. at 845. 
106.  Id. at 846. 
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Lohr was intoxicated at the time of the accident and died as a result of 
his sustained injuries.107 The trial jury awarded the plaintiff $31,000 in 
compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages.108 On appeal, 
the defendant contended that “punitive damages are not proper against 
the estate of a deceased tortfeasor, who is beyond material 
punishment.”109 The District Court of Appeals of Florida reduced the 
issue to “whether the factor of deterrence of other potential tortfeasors, 
standing alone, is a sufficient basis to sustain an award of punitive 
damages against an estate” and ultimately answered the question 
affirmatively.110 The Florida Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding 
that punitive damages could not be awarded against the deceased’s 
estate.111 The court acknowledged that punitive damages are imposed 
only to punish the tortfeasor and deter others from similar conduct and 
that the tortfeasor’s death left no one to punish.112 The court further held 
that “logic, common sense, and justice dictate that this [c]ourt follow the 
majority of jurisdictions in this country.”113 
In the Whetstone dissent, Judge Wise succinctly outlined the 
majority view: 
Since deterring the actual tortfeasor is no longer a possibility or a 
necessity, it is likewise no longer possible to hold him or her out as an 
example to deter others. Punishing his or her Estate is one step 
removed and therefore waters down or dilutes any such deterrent 
effect. Assessing punitive damages against an estate serves to neither 
punish nor deter the tortfeasor. I believe that separating the punishment 
from the deterrent aspect frustrates the purpose of punitive damages 
and that any deterrence would be speculative at best.114 
2. Minority Jurisdictions
A minority of jurisdictions has held that a claim for punitive 
damages can survive the death of the tortfeasor and can be awarded 
against a decedent’s estate.115 Oklahoma and Texas allow for such 
107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. The trial court thereafter granted the defendant’s remittitur as to the amount of 
punitive damages and reduced that amount to $9,000. Id. 
109.  Byrd v. Lohr, 488 So. 2d 138, 138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
110.  Id. at 138-40. 
111.  Lohr, 522 So. 2d at 847. 
112.  Id. 
113.  Id. 
114.  Whetstone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905, ¶ 33 (5th Dist.) (Wise, J., 
dissenting). 
115.  See Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 25; G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1131 (Pa. 
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recovery by statute.116 Most courts in the minority jurisdictions 
emphasize general deterrence in allowing the recovery of punitive 
damages against a decedent’s estate, while some give additional 
reasons.117 
Pennsylvania endorses the traditional view that punitive damages 
are meant to punish and deter certain behavior.118 However, in G.J.D. v. 
Johnson, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that imposing 
punitive damages on a deceased tortfeasor’s estate would serve a 
legitimate policy concern in deterring others from similar conduct.119 In 
G.J.D., an oft-cited case on this issue, the minor-plaintiff, G.J.D., was in 
an intimate relationship with Thebes, during which Thebes took sexually 
explicit photographs of G.J.D.120 Upon G.J.D. ending the relationship, 
Thebes distributed the photographs throughout the community.121 
Thereafter, G.J.D. brought suit against Thebes for defamation and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, among other causes of 
action.122 However, Thebes committed suicide before the trial, and 
Thebes’s sister, the executrix of his estate, was substituted as the 
defendant.123 The trial court awarded both compensatory and punitive 
damages to G.J.D., and the issue of whether punitive damages should 
have been awarded was appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania.124 
In its opinion, Pennsylvania’s high court extensively discussed the 
jurisdictional split on the issue and ultimately sided with the minority.125 
The court’s decision rested on the theory of general deterrence.126 
Specifically, the court stated that “[t]he deterrent effect on the conduct of 
1998); Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc., 31 P.3d 114, 119 (Ariz. 2001) (en banc); Perry v. Melton, 
299 S.E.2d 8, 13 (W. Va. 1982). 
 116.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 399 (End) of the First 
Sess. of the 55th Legislature (2015)); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.008, 71.009 
(West, Westlaw through end of 2015 Reg. Sess. of the 84th Legislature) (for wrongful death claims 
only). 
 117.  See Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 25; G.J.D., 713 A.2d at 1131; Haralson, 31 P.3d at 
116-17; Perry, 299 S.E.2d at 12-13. 
 118.  “[P]unitive damages are awarded to punish a defendant for certain outrageous acts and to 
deter him or others from engaging in similar conduct.” G.J.D., 713 A.2d at 1131 (citing Kirkbride 
v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 555 A.2d 800 (Pa. 1989)) (emphasis in original).
119.  Id.
120.  Id. at 1128. 
121.  Id.
122.  Id.
123.  G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1128 (Pa. 1998). 
124.  Id. at 1128-29.
125.  Id. at 1129-31. 
126.  Id. at 1131.
15
Beech: Adding Insult to Death
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
568 AKRON LAW REVIEW [49:553 
others is no more speculative in the instant case than in cases where the 
tortfeasor is alive.”127 Furthermore, the court believed that the heirs of 
Thebes’s estate would not be punished and, instead, would receive their 
rightful inheritance.128 Finally, the court was satisfied that other 
safeguards, including jury instructions, were sufficient to safeguard 
against a jury’s arbitrary imposition of punitive damages.129 
Similarly, minority courts have also held that awarding punitive 
damages against a decedent’s estate may be appropriate to “express 
society’s disapproval of outrageous conduct.”130 In certain situations 
where the tortfeasor is guilty of radical wrongdoing, such as bombings 
and mass murders, the estate of the tortfeasor should not be shielded 
from liability.131 Other minority jurisdictions adopt similar general 
deterrence arguments in support of the recovery of punitive damages 
following the death of the tortfeasor.132 Some minority courts further 
their position by arguing that the tortfeasor’s innocent heirs are not 
punished when punitive damages are assessed against the tortfeasor’s 
estate. In G.J.D., the court stated that “[t]he heirs of the decedent 
tortfeasor are in essentially the same financial position as if the 
tortfeasor were living at the time damages were awarded.”133 Thus, the 
estate’s inheritance is “generally contingent upon the obligations 
incurred by the deceased during his or her lifetime.”134 The heirs of the 
estate, then, still receive the assets rightfully owed to them. 
Other minority jurisdictions do not award punitive damages 
exclusively for the purposes of punishment and deterrence. In Hofer v. 
Lavender, the Supreme Court of Texas reaffirmed state common law in 
holding that punitive damages could be awarded “to reimburse for losses 
too remote to be considered as elements of strict compensation” and “for 
inconvenience and attorney’s fees” in addition to punishment and 
deterrence.135 Similarly, in Michigan, the express purpose of exemplary 
damages is to make the plaintiff whole.136 Specifically, a punitive award 
127.  Id. 
128.  G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1131 (Pa. 1998). 
129.  Id. 
130.  Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc., 31 P.3d 114, 117 (Ariz. 2001) (en banc) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
131.  Id. 
 132.  See Penberthy v. Price, 666 N.E.2d 352, 357 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding general 
deterrence and the “strong public policy against mixing alcohol and automobiles” justified the 
recovery of punitive damages following the death of the tortfeasor).  
133.  G.J.D., 713 A.2d at 1131. 
134.  Haralson, 31 P.3d at 118. 
135.  679 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tex. 1984). 
136.  Unibar Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Saigh, 769 N.W.2d 911, 923 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (per 
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may supplement an insufficient compensatory award.137 Thus, where the 
defendant maliciously injures the plaintiff, the injured party may recover 
punitive damages for humiliation and indignity.138 Although the 
Michigan Supreme Court has not sided with the majority or minority, 
the state’s purposes for awarding punitive damages align more closely 
with the minority reasoning for awarding such damages against 
estates.139 
In addition, minority courts argue that arbitrary punitive damage 
awards are safeguarded by the fact that the fact-finder may consider that 
the tortfeasor is deceased in deciding whether to award punitive 
damages.140 Furthermore, the fact-finder will be aware that any award of 
punitive damages would be assessed against the tortfeasor’s estate.141 
Adequate safeguards exist, and should be utilized, to protect against 
arbitrary, exorbitant, or otherwise improper verdicts. Jurors should be 
instructed to consider all aspects of fairness and justice in deciding 
whether, and in what amount, to award punitive damages. This would 
include the value of the estate and hardship to the heirs.142 
Furthermore, the jury may decline to award punitive damages 
altogether.143 Where the court finds the award outrageous, the judge may 
grant a remittitur or new trial.144 
In all, minority jurisdictions offer several arguments in support of 
allowing punitive damages to be assessed against estates. Some states 
differ in their purposes for awarding punitive damages. A few 
jurisdictions do not impose punitive damages solely to punish and deter 
certain conduct and instead place more emphasis on the plaintiff. The 
reasoning adopted by most minority courts in these cases is the theory of 
general deterrence. In other words, discouraging others in society from 
committing similar conduct is enough to justify awarding punitive 
damages against a decedent’s estate. 
curiam) (citing Hayes-Albion Corp. v. Kuberski, 364 N.W.2d 609 (Mich. 1984)). 
137.  Id. 
138.  Id. at 923-24 (citing Kewin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. 1980)). 
139.  See generally Iversen, supra note 86. 
140.  G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1131 (Pa. 1998). 
141.  Id. 
142.  Haralson v. Fisher Surverying, Inc., 31 P.3d 114, 119 (Ariz. 2001) (en banc). 
143.  Id. 
144.  Id. 
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III. THE IMPOSITION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST TORTFEASORS’
ESTATES 
“[T]he realm of the dead is not invaded, and punishment [is not] 
visited upon the dead.”145 Ohio’s survival statute ensures that a plaintiff 
will likely retain an interest in a cause of action against a deceased 
tortfeasor. However, a plaintiff should have no personal interest in the 
punishment of the deceased. This section discusses and analyzes the two 
main purposes of punitive damages in Ohio and the seminal Ohio cases 
that discuss punitive awards where a party to the case is deceased. An 
examination of the foregoing leads to the conclusion that imposing 
punitive damages against deceased tortfeasors’ estates is contrary to 
Ohio statutory and common law and raises major policy concerns. 
A. The Whetstone Holding is Contrary to Ohio Common Law 
Punitive damages are similar in nature to criminal punishments. 
Punishment for committing a crime is a general principle of criminal 
law.146 The theory of retributive justice provides that the wrongdoer 
should be punished in proportion to the crime committed.147 The 
doctrine of punitive damages was developed on similar principles, and 
punishment remains an integral purpose for awarding such damages in 
most jurisdictions.148 However, the punishment aspect of punitive 
damages is thwarted where the tortfeasor is deceased. The wrongdoer 
cannot be reprimanded for the tort when that person is not alive to accept 
the punishment. Similarly, some courts have held that a criminal 
proceeding abates upon the death of the accused because any further 
action would be moot.149 Because the Supreme Court of Ohio has 
consistently held that punishment is one aspect of punitive damages, 
awarding such damages where the tortfeasor is deceased would be 
contrary to that expressed purpose. 
Deterrence is also a principle of criminal law.150 There are two 
 145.  Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885, 887 (Miss. 1891), abrogated by Glaskox v. Glaskox, 
614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992). 
146.  See 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 870 Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015). 
147.  Id. 
148.  See Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 98 Ohio St. 3d 77, 2002-Ohio-7113, 
781 N.E.2d 121, ¶ 178. 
 149.  State v. Hoxsie, 1997 SD 119, ¶ 14, 570 N.W.2d 379, 382. The defendant in Hoxsie died 
during a pending appeal of his conviction. In holding that any further action was moot, the South 
Dakota Supreme Court highlighted the majority and minority views concerning the abatement of 
criminal proceedings following the death of the accused. Id. at ¶ 5-12, 570 N.W.2d at 379-82. 
150.  See 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 870 Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015). 
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types of deterrence: specific and general. In penalizing the wrongdoer, 
specific deterrence discourages the criminal from committing the crime 
again.151 In contrast, general deterrence discourages others in society 
from committing similar conduct.152 For the same reasons that a 
deceased tortfeasor cannot be punished, the tortfeasor cannot be 
specifically deterred from committing similar conduct again in the 
future. However, many minority courts rely on the theory of general 
deterrence alone in justifying the allowance of punitive damages against 
a deceased tortfeasor’s estate.153 
The Supreme Court of Ohio has acknowledged a plaintiff’s right to 
recover punitive damages in tort actions since as early as 1857.154 In 
developing the common law doctrine, the Court has repeatedly 
reinforced the traditional twin aims of awarding punitive damages: 
punishment and deterrence.155 Specifically, “[t]he policy for awarding 
punitive damages in Ohio ‘. . . has been recognized . . . as that of 
punishing the offending party and setting him up as an example to others 
that they might be deterred from similar conduct.’”156 Furthermore, the 
Court has expressed that punitive awards are “more about a defendant’s 
behavior than the plaintiff’s loss.”157 The purposes for which Ohio 
courts impose punitive damages are consistent with the majority position 
that punitive damages do not survive the death of the tortfeasor. Thus, 
the Whetstone holding to the contrary is inconsistent with Ohio common 
law. 
The Supreme Court of Ohio has never opined on the issue of 
whether punitive damages should be imposed against a decedent’s 
estate. Disallowing the recovery of such damages, however, would be 
consistent with the Court’s historical interpretation of punitive damages. 
Punishment and deterrence are the only espoused purposes for 
exemplary damages in Ohio.158 The tortfeasor must be chastised for 
151.  JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 51 (6th ed. 2012). 
152.  Id. at 50. 
153.  See, e.g., Whetstone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905, ¶ 27 (5th Dist.); G.J.D. 
v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1131 (Pa. 1998); Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc., 31 P.3d 114, 119
(Ariz. 2001) (en banc). 
154.  See Timberlake v. Cincinnati Gazette Co., 12 Ohio Dec. Reprint 646 (1857). 
 155.  See Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 98 Ohio St. 3d 77, 2002-Ohio-7113, 
781 N.E.2d 121, ¶ 178; Wightman v. Consol. Rail Corp., 715 N.E.2d 546, 553 (Ohio 1999).; 
Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331, 343 (Ohio 1994); Preston v. Murty, 512 N.E.2d 
1174, 1176 (Ohio 1987). 
156.  Preston, 512 N.E.2d at 1176 (citing Detling v. Chockley, 436 N.E.2d 208, 209 (Ohio 
1982), overruled on other grounds). 
157.  Wightman, 715 N.E.2d at 553. 
158.  See Dardinger at ¶ 178; Wightman, 715 N.E.2d at 553; Moskovitz, 635 N.E.2d at 343; 
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wrongdoing, discouraged from committing the act again, and publicly 
made an example of to deter others from similar conduct. However, 
under the minority view, there is only a potential, not a certainty, that 
society may be deterred from similar conduct. 
The Ohio appellate court stated, in Whetstone, that “the death of the 
tortfeasor does not completely thwart the purposes underlying the award 
of punitive damages.”159 The court was satisfied by the fact that punitive 
damages might deter others from committing similar conduct.160 
However, the court’s rationale is inconsistent with the Supreme Court of 
Ohio’s interpretation of punitive damages. General deterrence is aimed 
at the behavior of others in society, while specific deterrence addresses 
the tortfeasor specifically. Although “society” or “the general public” 
inherently includes the tortfeasor, general deterrence is more concerned 
with discouraging others in society from committing similar conduct. 
Though the tortfeasor’s malicious behavior remains the cause for 
recovery of punitive damages, such damages cannot be justified solely 
on the theory of general deterrence. In declining to award punitive 
damages against an estate based on deterring society in general, one 
court held that “punitive damages by way of example to others should be 
imposed only on actual wrongdoers.”161 
If courts must resort to the theory of general deterrence to justify 
awarding punitive damages against an estate, traditional compensatory 
damages should suffice. The threat of compensatory damages alone 
should be sufficient to deter the general public from committing similar 
conduct. In Whetstone, the trial court awarded the plaintiffs $500 for lost 
wages, $1,000 for emotional distress, and $50,000 for physical injury, 
emotional harm, and distress.162 The $51,500 in compensatory damages 
assessed against the deceased’s estate should be sufficient to generally 
deter others from like behavior. It would be a rare situation where a 
potential tortfeasor would not be deterred by the threat of compensatory 
damages, but, nevertheless, would be deterred by the possibility of 
punitive damages for the same conduct. It would be the extremely 
wealthy tortfeasor, indeed, who would be discouraged by punitive 
damages alone. 
General deterrence alone is too removed from the tortfeasor’s 
Preston, 512 N.E.2d at 1176. 
159.  Whetstone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905, ¶ 27 (5th Dist.). 
160.  Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 27. 
161.  Evans v. Gibson, 31 P.2d 389, 395 (Cal. 1934) (per curiam) (emphasis added). The 
phrase “actual wrongdoers” referred to living tortfeasors. 
162.  Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 10. 
20
Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 13
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss2/13
2016] ADDING INSULT TO DEATH 573 
actions to justify an award of punitive damages. It is unlikely that a 
potential wrongdoer would consider the effects of her actions on the 
heirs of her estate before committing a tort. In contrast, punishment of 
the tortfeasor is directly related to the tortfeasor’s actions. Retribution 
for wrongdoing can be monetarily assessed against the tortfeasor and is a 
necessary component to an award for punitive damages. Thus, because 
Ohio courts emphasize punishment and deterrence, rather than 
punishment or deterrence, as the goals of punitive damages, the 
Whetstone holding is contrary to the established state common law. 
B. The Rubeck Decision is Not Binding on the Issue in Whetstone 
The Whetstone court found support for its decision from the 
Supreme Court of Ohio decision in Rubeck v. Huffman163 and R.C. 
2305.21.164 In Whetstone, the court conceded that both the survival 
statute and the Rubeck decision are silent as to the imposition of punitive 
damages against an estate.165 Nevertheless, the Whetstone court held that 
the statute and case, taken together, provided persuasive authority to 
dispose of the issue.166 
In Rubeck, the defendant, Huffman, was driving an automobile in 
the wrong direction on a state highway when he struck and killed 
Rubeck in a head-on collision.167 Rubeck’s next of kin filed a wrongful 
death action against Huffman for negligence and sought $400 in 
property damage and personal injuries, $97,700 in pecuniary damages, 
and $100,000 in punitive damages.168 The trial court awarded the 
plaintiff both compensatory and punitive damages.169 In Ohio, punitive 
damages are not recoverable in a wrongful death action.170 Thus, for the 
trial court’s award of punitive damages to be upheld, Rubeck’s estate 
had to prove “that the deceased suffered personal injury or property loss 
 163.  374 N.E.2d 411 (Ohio 1978) (per curiam). See also Shaefer v. D & J Produce, Inc., 403 
N.E.2d 1015, 1019 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (holding, on facts similar to Rubeck, that the owner of a 
truck involved in a fatal accident may be liable for punitive damages due to injuries sustained by 
plaintiff’s decedent who allegedly died as a result of the accident). 
 164.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.21 (West, Westlaw through Files 1-29 of 131st Gen. Ass. 
2015-2016). 
165.  Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 26. 
166.  Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶26. 
167.  Rubeck, 374 N.E.2d at 412. 
168.  Id. 
169.  Id.  
170.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02 (West, Westlaw through Files 1-29 of 131st Gen. Ass. 
2015-2016). See also Rubeck, 374 N.E.2d at 413. 
21
Beech: Adding Insult to Death
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
574 AKRON LAW REVIEW [49:553 
as a result of the collision and before he died . . . .”171 The court held, 
pursuant to R.C. 2305.21, that “the right to . . . [punitive] damages 
continues even when the person so injured has died and the personal 
injury or property loss is pursued by the representative of his 
estate . . . .”172 
The Whetstone court opined that Rubeck, in conjunction with R.C. 
2305.21, stands for the proposition that all causes of action, including all 
elements of recovery, survive the death of the plaintiff or the 
tortfeasor.173 In essence, the court held that because a claim for punitive 
damages survives the death of a plaintiff under R.C. 2305.21, then the 
same claim can survive the death of a tortfeasor for the same 
reasoning.174 However, the court’s reliance on Rubeck is inconsistent 
with the purposes for awarding punitive damages and the Supreme Court 
of Ohio’s prior decisions. 
The death of a plaintiff before trial should be distinguished and 
treated differently than the death of a defendant in a tort action where the 
plaintiff seeks punitive damages. Simply put, in Ohio, a punitive award 
is not concerned with the harm to the plaintiff. The plaintiff is merely 
responsible for presenting evidence that the defendant acted maliciously, 
which entitles the plaintiff to punitive damages. Thus, whether the 
plaintiff is living or deceased is immaterial to the fact-finder’s decision 
to award punitive damages. In contrast, punitive awards in Ohio are 
based solely on the defendant’s behavior.175 Where the defendant is 
deceased, the reasons behind punitive damages are no longer furthered. 
In a case such as Rubeck, where the plaintiff’s estate (or next of kin) 
seeks punitive damages from a living defendant, the goals of punishment 
and deterrence of the defendant are not frustrated. A living defendant 
can be punished and made “an example to others that they might be 
deterred from similar conduct.”176 
Also, the facts of Whetstone are distinguishable from the facts of 
Rubeck. Whetstone involved a living parent-guardian and two living 
minors as plaintiffs. The tortfeasor in Whetstone was alive at the time of 
the misconduct but died before the commencement of a hearing on the 
171.  Rubeck, 374 N.E.2d at 413-14. 
 172.  Id. at 413. The Court nevertheless held that the plaintiff did not prove that the decedent 
suffered property damage or personal injury as a result of the collision. Id. at 414. Thus, Rubeck 
was not entitled to punitive damages. Id. 
173.  Whetstone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.). 
174.  Id. 
175.  Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 98 Ohio St.3d 77, 2002-Ohio-7113, 781 
N.E.2d 121, ¶ 178. 
176.  Preston v. Murty, 512 N.E.2d 1174, 1176 (Ohio 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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issue of damages.177 In contrast, the plaintiff in Rubeck was deceased at 
the time of the trial while the defendant-tortfeasor was still living.178 The 
position of the deceased party as plaintiff or defendant directly affects 
the efficacy of a punitive damages award. In a case like Rubeck, the twin 
aims of punishment and deterrence can be pursued against a living 
defendant. However, those same purposes are severely frustrated where 
the tortfeasor is deceased, as was the case in Whetstone. 
C. The Whetstone Holding is Not Supported by Ohio Statutory Law 
The Ohio legislature has adopted a statute that expressly provides 
the elements of recovery for punitive damages.179 However, the punitive 
damages statute gives no guidance as to the recovery of punitive 
damages against an estate. Ohio courts deciding the issue, therefore, 
look exclusively to the survival statute, R.C. 2305.21. The Whetstone 
court found support for its conclusion in R.C. 2305.21, which is silent as 
to the recovery of punitive damages.180 Revised Code 2305.21 allows 
plaintiffs to recover compensatory damages as if the deceased party were 
alive at the time of the trial.181 However, punitive damages are different 
in nature from compensatory damages. In Ohio, where compensatory 
damages are awarded to make the plaintiff whole, punitive damages are 
meant only to punish and deter the defendant. In awarding punitive 
damages, the finder of fact assumes compensatory damages are not only 
necessary, but have already been awarded to the injured party.182 
Because the survival statute does not expressly allow claims for punitive 
damages against estates, Ohio courts should be hesitant to include them 
because such inclusion upsets the established doctrine of punitive 
awards. 
Allowing the recovery of compensatory damages pursuant to R.C. 
2305.21 is necessary for the proper administration of justice. 
Compensating a plaintiff for a legally recognized harm is the basis for an 
action in tort. If R.C. 2305.21 forbade the injured party from being made 
whole, one important goal of filing suit, obtaining damages would be 
completely extinguished. However, in order to recover punitive damages 
177.  Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶¶ 3, 6. 
178.  Rubeck v. Huffman, 374 N.E.2d 411, 412 (Ohio 1978) (per curiam). 
179.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (West, Westlaw through Files 1-29 of 131st Gen. Ass. 
2015-2016). 
180.  Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 26. 
181.  Whetstone, 2014-Ohio-3018 at ¶ 26. 
182.  § 2315.21(C)(2) (Westlaw). Compensatory damages are a necessary prerequisite to 
punitive damages. See § 2315.21(B)(1)(b) (Westlaw). 
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in Ohio, compensatory damages must have already been awarded.183 The 
compensatory award should have, then, already made the plaintiff 
whole.184 In contrast, punitive damages go far beyond the purposes of 
compensatory damages. Such awards are further removed from the 
plaintiff and are not necessary to make the injured party whole. 
Awarding punitive damages after the death of the party liable thereto is, 
therefore, inconsistent with the doctrine of punitive damages and 
unnecessary to further compensate the injured plaintiff. 
The Individual Business Services v. Carmack case,185 an Ohio 
Common Pleas Court decision cited in Whetstone, held that even though 
R.C. 2305.21 is silent as to the recovery of punitive damages, such 
damages are a “component” of an action for fraud, and thus, the statute 
allowed for the recovery of punitive damages against an estate.186 The 
Individual Business Services court essentially concluded that because 
R.C. 2305.21 allows an action for fraud to survive the death of a litigant 
and because one can recover punitive damages for fraud, such damages 
may automatically be recovered against a deceased tortfeasor’s estate in 
all causes of action under R.C. 2305.21.187 However, the court’s analysis 
bypasses the issue. While it is true that punitive damages can be 
recovered in a fraud case, that fact alone is no basis for concluding that 
punitive damages can be awarded against an estate. Punitive damages 
are a “component” of several causes of actions in that it is possible for 
the plaintiff to recover them. The Individual Business Services court, 
however, declined to address the propriety of issuing punitive damages 
against an estate and did not reconcile the fact that a punitive award in 
that situation frustrates both the retributive and deterrent aspects of such 
damages.188 Instead, the court took the easy way out by holding that 
because an action for fraud survives the death of a litigant, punitive 
damages can be recovered for fraud, and thus, punitive damages survive 
as well. 
183.  Niskanen v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 122 Ohio St. 3d 486, 2009-Ohio-3626, 912 N.E.2d 595, ¶ 
13. 
 184.  There are, of course, some circumstances, such as where the plaintiff seeks injunctive 
relief, where monetary damages are an insufficient remedy to make the plaintiff whole.  
185.  Montgomery C.P. No. 2004 CV 08159, 2009 WL 8235992 (Dec. 17, 2009). 
186.  Id. at *3. 
187.  Id. 
188.  Id. 
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D. A Claim for Punitive Damages is Not a “Cause of Action” for 
Purposes of Ohio’s Survivor Statute 
A “cause of action” describes “[a] group of operative facts giving 
rise to one or more bases for suing” or “a factual situation that entitles 
one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person.”189 It is 
simply the theory for a lawsuit. Damages, in contrast, are awards 
“claimed by, or ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation for loss 
or injury.”190 Thus, a plaintiff has no ability to institute a cause of action 
simply “for damages.” Rather, a plaintiff must sue a defendant under a 
distinct cause of action and, through that mechanism, seek damages. 
Actionable offenses include, among countless others, assault, battery, 
negligence, and breach of contract. A proven assault entitles a plaintiff 
to a remedy in court from another person. A cause of action for assault 
gives the victim a basis for suing, while damages are merely the remedy. 
The cause of action is usually the beginning of the judicial process, 
while an award of damages likely ends the process. 
The Iowa Supreme Court was recently faced with a case analogous 
to Whetstone involving many of the same arguments.191 Iowa, like Ohio, 
codified the justification for recovering punitive damages.192 
Furthermore, the Iowa legislature enacted a survival statute nearly 
identical to that of Ohio.193 In In re Estate of Vajgrt, the Iowa Supreme 
Court considered whether the right to recover punitive damages survives 
the death of the tortfeasor.194 The proponent for recovering exemplary 
damages argued, among other things, that Iowa’s survivor statute should 
allow the recovery of punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor’s 
estate.195 Nevertheless, the court reaffirmed its position with the majority 
jurisdictions in holding that punitive damages could not be awarded 
against the estate.196 The court held that “punitive damages do not 
constitute a distinct ‘cause of action’” for purposes of the Iowa Survival 
Statute.197 Instead, the court classified exemplary damages as “a form of 
relief incidental to the main cause of action” that is not encompassed by 
189.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 251 (9th ed. 2009). 
190.  Id. at 444. 
191.  In re Estate of Vajgrt, 801 N.W.2d 570 (Iowa 2011). 
192.  IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1 (West, Westlaw through end of 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
193.  “All causes of action shall survive and may be brought notwithstanding the death of the 
person entitled or liable to the same.” § 611.20 (Westlaw). 
194.  801 N.W.2d at 572. 
195.  Id. at 573-74. 
196.  Id. at 577-78. 
197.  Id. at 574. 
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the statute.198 
In contrast, the Whetstone court held that R.C. 2305.21, taken 
together with the Rubeck opinion, stands for the proposition that “all 
causes of action, including all elements of recovery, survive as if the 
deceased party were still alive both on behalf of the estate of decedent 
and against the estate of the tortfeasor.”199 However, the court’s blanket 
inclusion of “all causes of action” is inconsistent with both the text and 
judicial interpretations of the statute. The statute allows all common law 
actions to survive.200 In addition, actions for mesne profits, injuries to 
the person or property, deceit, and fraud also survive the death of the 
person entitled or liable thereto.201 All other causes of action not 
mentioned do not survive pursuant to R.C. 2305.21.202 Furthermore, 
Ohio courts have held that several causes of action do not survive under 
the statute.203 The Whetstone court’s interpretation of the statute’s 
language is more consistent with other states’ survival statutes, such as 
Michigan’s, which provides that “[a]ll actions and claims survive 
death.”204 The Michigan legislature’s inclusion of all actions and claims 
provides a clearer intent that all elements of recovery are intended to 
survive the tortfeasor’s death. However, the Ohio statute, which merely 
refers to “causes of action,” provides a much weaker basis for the 
inclusion of claims for punitive damages. 
It follows, then, that there can be no cause of action for punitive 
damages in Ohio under the survivor statute. The “causes of action” and 
“actions” described by R.C. 2305.21 expressly include common law 
causes of action, causes of action for mesne profits, personal and 
proprietal injuries, fraud, and deceit.205 Remedies, specifically punitive 
damages, are not mentioned in the statute as a cause of action, and a 
198.  Id. (citing Sebastian v. Wood, 66 N.W.2d 841, 844 (Iowa 1954)). 
199.  Whetstone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.). 
200.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.21 (West, Westlaw through Files 1-29 of 131st Gen. Ass. 
2015-2016). 
201.  § 2305.21 (Westlaw). 
202.  § 2305.21 (Westlaw). 
203.  See Hook v. Springfield, 750 N.E.2d 1162, 1167 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (worker’s 
compensation); Oakwood v. Makar, 463 N.E.2d 61, 64 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (slander); Stein-Sapir 
v. Birdsell, 673 F.2d 165, 167 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (applying Ohio law) (libel); Alsup v.
Int’l Union of Bricklayers, 679 F. Supp. 716, 721 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (applying Ohio law) (violation 
of civil rights); State ex rel. Crow v. Weygandt, 162 N.E.2d 845, 848 (Ohio 1959) (malicious 
prosecution). 
 204.  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2921 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2015, No. 172 of the 2015 
Reg. Sess., 98th Legislature). See also Iversen, supra note 75, at 838. 
 205.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.21 (West, Westlaw through Files 1-29 of 131st Gen. Ass. 
2015-2016). 
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cause of action distinctly seeking damages does not coincide with the 
text of the statute or the meaning of “cause of action.” Thus, merely 
because the statute permits certain actions to survive the death of a 
litigant does not also mean that all elements of recovery in those actions 
automatically survive as well. 
IV. POLICY AND PRESCRIPTION OF IMPOSING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
AGAINST AN ESTATE IN OHIO 
This section discusses the policy implications of the Whetstone 
decision and offers ways to achieve change. Part A discusses the 
negative outcomes that flow from imposing punitive damages against 
deceased tortfeasors. Part B discusses the positive policy implications of 
the majority view. Part C offers methods of changing the current Ohio 
law, including through the courts and legislature. 
A. Negative Ramifications of the Minority Position 
Majority jurisdictions have repeatedly held that “[t]here is a strong 
policy against the assessment of punitive damages against an estate on 
account of the wrongful conduct of the decedent.”206 Where the core 
principles of any legal doctrine are not furthered, there is bound to be a 
negative impact on society. The holding in Whetstone is no different as it 
allows punitive awards to punish the tortfeasor’s innocent heirs and 
denies the tortfeasor the ability to repudiate the claim. 
“To allow exemplary damages now would be to punish his legal 
and personal representatives for his wrongful act, but the civil law never 
inflicts vicarious punishment.”207 The law should not delegate the 
punishment of one party (the tortfeasor) to an innocent third party (the 
tortfeasor’s heirs). In effect, the minority view reaches far beyond the 
wrongdoer, possibly into the lives of the tortfeasor’s family, friends, and 
other loved ones. A punitive award should only punish the tortfeasor, not 
innocent third parties. Punishing the estate’s innocent heirs has the 
unwanted policy effect of allowing a claim for punitive damages to 
survive the death of the tortfeasor that “waters down or dilutes any . . . 
effect” of punitive damages.208 Furthermore, “to punish the estate 
ignores the central purpose of punitive damages, which is to punish the 
206.  Flaum v. Birnbaum, 582 N.Y.S.2d 853, 857 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). 
 207.  In re Estate of Vajgrt, 801 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Iowa 2011) (quoting Sheik v. Hobson, 19 
N.W. 875, 875-76 (Iowa 1884) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
208.  Whetstone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905, ¶ 33 (5th Dist.) (Wise, J., 
dissenting). 
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tortfeasor and to deter him from repeating the wrongful act.”209 
In addition, a deceased defendant is no longer available to testify.210 
Typically, in an adversarial justice system, both the plaintiff and 
defendant are able to tell their side of the story, ensuring a truer form of 
justice. However, where the defendant is deceased, one side of the story 
is silenced.211 This poses no problem for a compensatory award as such 
an award is focused on the plaintiff and making the plaintiff whole, 
rather than the defendant’s wrongdoing. Although others may testify to 
the facts surrounding the case, only the defendant can effectively combat 
a claim for punitive damages. The wrongdoer must be present to testify 
as to how he did not act maliciously in order to refute the elements for 
the recovery of punitive damages. Where punitive damages may be 
awarded against an estate, the fact-finder is able to punish the estate’s 
innocent heirs, and the tortfeasor has no chance to personally repudiate 
the claim. 
B. Positive Ramifications of the Majority Position 
A holding that punitive damages cannot be imposed against an 
estate would create positive policy implications. Most importantly, the 
majority view reinforces the traditional aims of punitive awards. Both 
punishment and deterrence can be accomplished by imposing punitive 
damages against a living defendant. In addition, the minority’s over-
emphasis on the deterrent effect of punitive damages in this situation 
ultimately undermines the policy behind the substantive law.212 The 
majority view, in contrast, stays true to the twin aims, rather than placing 
too much weight and importance on deterrence alone. That is, under the 
majority view, the goal is efficient and effective deterrence, not 
deterrence at all costs. On the other hand, the minority view clings to the 
theory of general deterrence and, in turn, overplays the traditional 
reasons for imposing punitive damages. While the minority view strays 
from the express purposes of punitive damages and focuses solely on 
general deterrence, the majority position furthers the purposes for 
punitive awards that have been repeatedly accepted by Ohio courts. 
Furthermore, this issue goes beyond the realm of the law and into 
 209.  Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 871 P.2d 1343, 1351 (N.M. 1994) (emphasis 
added). 
210.  Vajgrt, 801 N.W.2d at 573. 
 211.  This is, of course, true in any action where a litigant is deceased. However, as the express 
purposes of punitive damages are different than any other civil remedy, it is worth noting that the 
tortfeasor is prohibited from testifying. 
212.  The underlying policy is, of course, the punishment and deterrence of the tortfeasor. 
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the realm of the dead.213 Rather than add insult to injury (or more 
accurately, add insult to death), the law should afford some level of 
respect to the deceased. The majority view does just that. Punishment for 
wrongdoing must stop at the grave, and the wrongdoer’s friends and 
family must not be subjected to additional pain and suffering at the 
hands of the law. In order to maintain the integrity of the deceased and 
provide the respect that they deserve, no Ohio law should go as far as 
punishing the dead. The majority view upholds these basic principles. 
C. Prescription for Change 
This subsection discusses the possible avenues for achieving 
change in the current Ohio laws concerning the imposition of punitive 
damages against estates. Part 1 examines change through the courts, 
which is the most likely possibility because this issue is currently under 
consideration in the Supreme Court of Ohio. Part 2 discusses a viable 
alternative: change though legislative action. 
1. Achieving Change Through the Courts
The Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in Whetstone provides no 
certainty to the law in Ohio, except in the limited circumstances of that 
case. The Court did not announce a bright line rule as to whether 
punitive damages may be imposed against an estate. A different set of 
facts could bring the issue before the Court again in the future. For 
example, the Court’s holding in Whetstone would not be applicable in a 
case where the tortfeasor dies after the trial court renders a judgment 
against her. In that case, an Ohio court would not be bound by the 
Court’s decision, unless the court is in the Fifth Appellate District.214 If 
given another opportunity, the Supreme Court should reconcile the 
holding in Rubeck215 with more recent decisions, including the appellate 
decision in Whetstone, 216 Mongold,217 and Individual Business 
Services.218 Given the possibility of future inconsistent decisions among 
Ohio courts, the Supreme Court of Ohio should declare the state’s 
 213.  See Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885, 887 (Miss. 1891), abrogated by Glaskox v. 
Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992). 
214.  See Section IV.C.2, infra. 
215.  Rubeck v. Huffman, 374 N.E.2d 411 (Ohio 1978) (per curiam). 
216.  Whetstone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905 (5th Dist.). 
217.  Mongold v. Estate of Gilbert, 114 Ohio Misc. 2d 32, 758 N.E.2d 1245 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 
2000). 
 218.  See Individual Bus. Servs., Inc. v Carmack, Montgomery C.P. No. 2004 CV 08159, 2009 
WL 8235992 (Dec. 17, 2009). 
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position once and for all. 
2. Achieving Change Through the Legislature
As aforementioned, uncertainty remains after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Whetstone. The rule expressed by the appellate court in 
Whetstone is now the law of the Fifth Appellate District in Ohio. Though 
the court’s holding is not legally binding on the entire state, other 
appellate districts may look to Whetstone in forming an opinion as to 
whether punitive damages may be imposed against estates. An appellate 
decision can be persuasive to other appellate districts, especially when 
the deciding district has not opined on the issue. Given the likelihood 
that other appellate courts will be faced with the problem of whether to 
assess punitive damages against an estate, the Ohio legislature may be 
better suited to decide the issue than the courts. 
Ohio is composed of twelve appellate districts.219 If faced with the 
issue, each district court of appeals could arrive at different conclusions. 
Furthermore, each court could employ different reasoning for its 
disposition. Such conflicting opinions would further confuse the 
purposes and policies of punitive damages in Ohio. The Ohio General 
Assembly could curtail future problems with an amendment to an 
existing statute or the adoption of a new law addressing whether punitive 
damages can be awarded against a deceased tortfeasor’s estate. Ohio 
could look to other jurisdictions in crafting a bright-line rule on the 
issue. 
Sixteen other states have settled the issue through statute.220 The 
legislatures in those states have addressed the specific question of 
whether courts and juries can impose punitive damages against a 
deceased tortfeasor’s estate. Nearly ninety percent of them codified the 
conclusion that punitive damages do not survive the death of the 
tortfeasor.221 The California survival statute, last amended in 1992, states 
that all damages are recoverable against a decedent’s estate as if the 
decedent were living “except . . . punitive or exemplary damages.”222 
The New York survival statute, last amended in 1982, provides: “For 
any injury, an action may be brought or continued against the personal 
 219.  See The Supreme Court of Ohio & The Ohio Judicial System, Ohio Courts of Appeal, 
SUPREMECOURT.OHIO.GOV, http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/judsystem/districtcourts/ (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2015). 
220.  See infra Appendices B and D. 
221.  See infra Appendix B. 
222.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.42 (West, Westlaw through emergency leg. through Ch. 
807 of 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
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representative of the decedent, but punitive damages shall not be 
awarded nor penalties adjudged in any such action brought to recover 
damages for personal injury.”223 
Most other jurisdictions addressing the imposition of punitive 
damages after the death of the tortfeasor have remedied the issue 
through the state’s survival statutes. Ohio’s survival statute (R.C. 
2305.21) has not been revised since its adoption in 1953,224 and there 
have been no issues that call for a reinterpretation of the statute until 
Whetstone. The Ohio legislature, however, has passed a lengthy statute 
addressing the recovery of punitive damages, which was last amended in 
2005.225 The General Assembly revised Ohio’s punitive damages law, 
but declined to address the issue here. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
of Ohio “places little weight on legislative inaction as a barometer for 
determining legislative intent . . . .”226 Therefore, the legislature’s silence 
on whether to impose punitive damages against estates does not indicate 
its intent to side with the majority or minority. 
Though an Ohio appellate court had not yet decided if punitive 
damages could be imposed against an estate in 2005 (when the punitive 
damages statute was revised), the Supreme Court had considered 
whether a plaintiff’s estate was entitled to such damages in Rubeck, and 
at least one Ohio trial court had opined that punitive damages could not 
survive the death of the tortfeasor.227 If the Ohio legislature intended a 
result to the contrary, it has had ample opportunities to add a provision 
to either the punitive damages statute or the survival statute. 
However, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “legislative 
inaction in the face of longstanding judicial interpretations of that 
section [of a statute] evidences legislative intent to retain existing 
law.”228 Furthermore, “[i]n interpreting the meaning of legislative 
language, it is not unimportant that the General Assembly has failed to 
amend the legislation subsequent to a prior interpretation thereof by [the 
Supreme Court of Ohio].”229 Based on the court’s longstanding statutory 
 223.  N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-3.2 (McKinney’s, Westlaw through L.2015, 
chps. 1 to 417). 
 224.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.21 (West, West, Westlaw through Files 1-29 of 131st 
Gen. Ass. 2015-2016). 
 225.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (West, West, Westlaw through Files 1-29 of 131st 
Gen. Ass. 2015-2016). 
226.  Roosevelt Prop. Co. v. Kinney, 465 N.E.2d 421, 425 (Ohio 1984) (per curiam). 
227.  Mongold v. Estate of Gilbert, 114 Ohio Misc. 2d 32, 758 N.E.2d 1245 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 
2000). 
228.  State v. Cichon, 399 N.E.2d 1259, 1261 (Ohio 1980). 
 229.  Seeley v. Expert, Inc., 269 N.E.2d 121, 129 (Ohio 1971) (citing Mahoning Valley Ry. 
Co. v. Van Alstine, 83 N.E. 601 (Ohio 1908)). 
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interpretation law, it seems clear that the General Assembly has 
acquiesced to the 1978 Rubeck decision due to its failure to subsequently 
amend the law. Yet, the legislature’s silence on the issue here provides 
no guidance as to legislative intent because the issue has not reached the 
Supreme Court of Ohio and has only recently been reviewed by an Ohio 
appellate court. In any event, if the legislature decides to address the 
issue, it should adopt the majority view.230 Ohio statutory and common 
law support the position that punitive damages should not be imposed 
against a deceased tortfeasor’s estate. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Ohio, only two specific purposes justify an award for punitive 
damages. Both punishment and deterrence must be satisfied in order for 
a fact-finder to impose punitive damages against a tortfeasor. However, 
where the tortfeasor dies before the damages are awarded, these 
purposes are severely frustrated. Punitive damages cannot punish a 
deceased tortfeasor because the wrongdoer can no longer be physically 
reprimanded. Furthermore, a deceased tortfeasor can no longer be 
deterred from similar conduct in the future. General deterrence is the 
only reasonable justification for awarding punitive damages against an 
estate. Yet, it seems highly unlikely that the distant threat of punitive 
damages will deter others in society from maliciously committing torts. 
Ohio statutory law is also consistent with the majority view. Ohio’s 
punitive damages statute and survival statute are both silent as to the 
issue at bar. However, the express language of each statute, considered 
separately or taken together, align with the position that does not allow 
punitive damages to survive the death of the tortfeasor. In addition, 
negative policy implications arise from the minority view, while the 
majority view suggests positive policy outcomes. Given the recent 
Supreme Court decision in Whetstone and the continuing potential for 
conflicting opinions among Ohio appellate courts, the legislature may be 
in a better position than the courts to dispose of the matter. In any event, 
whether accomplished judicially or statutorily, Ohio should align with 
the majority of jurisdictions in holding that a claim for punitive damages 
cannot survive the death of the tortfeasor. 
 230.  The issue would certainly be ripe for legislative action if another Ohio appellate court 
issues a conflicting opinion. 
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VI. APPENDICES231
Appendix A—Majority View-Judicial Adoption 
Alaska—Doe v. Colligan, 753 P.2d 144 (Alaska 1988). 
District of Columbia—Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 665 
A.2d 929 (D.C. 1995), opinion amended on denial of rehearing by 
Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 681 A.2d 1097 (D.C. 1996). 
Florida—Lohr v. Byrd, 522 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1988). 
Indiana—Crabtree ex rel. Kemp v. Estate of Crabtree, 837 N.E.2d 
135 (Ind. 2005). 
Iowa—In re Estate of Vajgrt, 801 N.W.2d 570 (Iowa 2011). 
Kansas—Fehrenbacher v. Quackenbush, 759 F. Supp. 1516 (D. 
Kan. 1991) (applying Kansas law). 
Kentucky—Stewart v. Estate of Cooper, 102 S.W.3d 913 (Ky. 
2003). 
Minnesota—Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400 
(Minn. 1982). 
Missouri—Tietjens v. Gen. Motors Corp., 418 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 
1967). 
New Mexico—Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 871 P.2d 
1343 (N.M. 1994). 
North Carolina—Harrell v. Bowen, 655 S.E.2d 350 (N.C. 2008). 
South Dakota—Olson-Roti v. Kilcoin, 2002 SD 131, 653 N.W.2d 
254. 
Tennessee—Hayes v. Gill, 390 S.W.2d 213 (Tenn. 1965). 
Wyoming—Parker v. Artery, 889 P.2d 520 (Wyo. 1995). 
Appendix B—Majority View-Statutory Adoption 
California—CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.42 (West 2014). 
Colorado—COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-20-101 (West 2014). 
Georgia—GA. CODE ANN. § 9-2-41 (West 2014). 
Idaho—IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-327 (West 2014). 
Maine—ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3-818 (2014). 
Massachusetts—MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 230, § 2 (West 2014). 
Mississippi—MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-7-235 (West 2014). 
 231.  The empirical data is based on several sources and my own research on the subject. See 
G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1129-30 & nn.4 & 6 (Pa. 1998); Emily Himes Iversen, Note, 
Invading The Realm Of The Dead: Exploring The (Im)propriety Of Punitive Damages Awards 
Against Estates, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 827, 831-35 (2014); Timothy R. Robicheaux & Brian H. 
Bornstein, Punished, Dead or Alive: Empirical Perspectives on Awarding Punitive Damages 
Against Deceased Defendants, 16 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 393, 410 (2010); Jay M. Zitter, 
Annotation, Claim for Punitive Damages in Tort Action as Surviving Death of Tortfeasor or Person 
Wronged, 30 A.L.R. 4TH 707 (1984). 
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Nevada—NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.100 (West 2014). 
New York—N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-3.2 
(McKinney’s 2014). 
Oregon—OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.080 (West 1983). 
Rhode Island—R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-8 (West 2014). 
Vermont—VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1454 (West 2014). 
Virginia—VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-25 (West 2014). 
Wisconsin—WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.02 (West 2014). 
Appendix C—Minority View-Judicial Adoption 
Alabama—Ellis v. Zuck, 546 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1977) (applying 
Alabama law). 
Arizona—Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc., 31 P.3d 114 (Ariz. 
2001) (en banc.). 
Hawaii—Kaopuiki v. Kealoha, 87 P.3d 910 (Haw. Ct. App. 2003). 
Illinois—Penberthy v. Price, 666 N.E.2d 352 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). 
Montana—Tillett v. Lippert, 909 P.2d 1158 (Mont. 1996). 
Ohio—Whetstone v. Binner, 2014-Ohio-3018, 15 N.E.3d 905 (5th 
Dist.). 
Pennsylvania—G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127 (Pa. 1998). 
South Carolina—In re Thomas, 254 B.R. 879 (D.S.C. 1999) 
(applying South Carolina law). 
West Virginia—Perry v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8 (W. Va. 1982). 
Appendix D—Minority View-Statutory Adoption 
Texas—TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.008, 71.009 
(West 2014). 
Oklahoma—OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053 (West 2014). 
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